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BOOK REVIEWS
CuiE AM JUSTICE. By Sheldon Glueck.
1936. pp. viii, 349. $3.00.

Boston: Little, Brown, and Company.

This book is based upon eight lectures delivered to a lay audience by the Professor of Criminology in Harvard Law School. Although he has added some fifty
pages of elaborate notes for the benefit of specialists, be has written his book, as
he prepared his lectures, primarily for the purpose of ififorming laymen about what
is undoubtedly a sorry state of affairs and of advising them regarding what ought to
be done in order to make it a better state of affairs, in thq hope, apparently, that
they will firmly resolve that what must be done shall be done.' In view of his purpose, it is not surprising that Professor Glueck's book should contain little that has
not been often said before either by himself or by others; with great skill he has
fashioned out of twice told tales a very comprehensive, although necessarily a very
general, survey of the problem of crime as it exists in the American society.
Justice is the name by which he refers to the totality of our efforts to deal
with crime by law. He believes that Justice is very sick indeed and he diagnoses
and then prescribes for her ills. Although I am also of the opinion that she is far
from well and in need of immediate and extensive therapy, I fear that his
diagnosis may lead laymen to expect too much of her when she is restored to
health. For, unless we have a physiology of the healthy organism, there is always
the danger that we may be mistaken as -to the existence and extent of disease, that
we may regard the inherent weaknesses of the organism as pathological rather than
as natural imperfections. While some of the inadequacies of Justice are surely
attributable to pathological conditions, others are just as surely intrinsic to her nature. Because of the fallibility of human wisdom, the intractability of human behavior and the insufficiency of law, efforts to deal with crime by legal devices can be
only partly successful, however prudent they may be and whatever their objectives.
Professor Glueck nowhere distinguishes sharply between those imperfections of Justice
which are essential and therefore ineradicable and those which are accidental and
hence remediable, but to some extent confuses them.
His first major diagnostic finding is that Justice suffers from evil social and
economic conditions which not only make it more difficult for her to p-rform her
tasks than ever before, but also breed more and more crime out of human frailties.
He therefore prescribes numerous changes in our social order designed to improve the
health, the education, the recreation and the economic status of the disadvantaged
among us; the purpose of these remedies is to prevent crime by extirpating or controlling the factors that produce criminals. While he does not believe that these measures
can prevent all crime, 2 he is very confident that they will greatly reduce crime; and I
1. As he himself has put it, he has "stressed the ills of criminal justice in the belief
that by studying the diseased organ we may be able to obtain some light on the deztructive
forces at work and perhaps some hints as to the therapeutic and prophylactic mea-ures that
are indicated," p. vii.
2. After quoting Parmelee to the effect that the criminal class consists in part of intractable, rebellious, and unadaptable persons who are sure to react against any form of
social control, he says: "This is one reason why it is naive to assume that either crime or a
'class struggle' would completely disappear in a socialistic state. If there were not one
motive for the struggle of man against man, there would be another in its place. . . . As
long as the springs of human nature spurt forth anger, hatred, fear, jealousy, envy and likre
emotions, we may expect agressions by some members of society against their fellows." (p.
266) In short, only an impossible metamorphosis either of human nature or of human
society can wholly prevent crime.
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fear that his confidence may lead laymen to expect too much of even the most wisely
contrived programs of crime prevention. For, according to Professor Glueck himself,
criminologists do not know precisely what factors cause crime or how those which
appear to do so, cooperate to produce criminality. In short, they cannot really
answer such crucial questions as why some of the disadvantaged children who are
reared under similar deleterious conditions become criminals but the majority do
not 3 In answer to such questions they can only advance a "reasonable theory," the
essence of which appears to be that "the criminal act occurring at any given time is
the outcome of constitutional and acquired personal and social forces. ' 4 Now that
is surely ancient wisdom and not modem science, a commonplace which has long
been used to direct efforts to prevent crime, and with less success than we should
have liked. 5 Professor Glueck's confident belief that it can now be used more successfully seems to rest ultimately upon the fact that as a result of recent criminological
investigations, including his own excellent researches, we now know more than we have
previously known about the characteristics of particular criminals and of their
environments. 6 But this new descriptive knowledge is of precisely the same sort as
the old and intrinsically of no greater utility. Like the old, it is useful only in so
far as it has revealed that some criminals, at any rate, have characteristics of which
we were previously unaware, and has thus suggested to us new' ways of attempting
3. Professor Glueck discusses the present status of criminology at pp. 4, 98, 108-9, and
175-6. He says that while criminologists have been able to draw some rough generalizations about the characteristics of criminals and the results of peno-correctional treatment
and to formulate a fruitful hypothesis or two regarding the interplay of individual and
cultural factors (p. 108), there is sitill a vast amount to be learned about the Influences
operative in crime and punishment. (p. 109) And the learning is beset with great, If
not with insuperable, difficulties: we cannot obtain completely valid samples of criminals
or comparable control groups of non-criminals; it is almost impossible as yet completely
to differentiate innate from acquired tendencies; the very mechanicisms of human heredity
are as yet far from clear. (pp. 175-7)
It seems to me that Professor Glueck has underestimated the difficulties. In that connection see MicHAEL.& ADLER, CPmim LAW AND SoaAL SCIENcE (1933) c. IV, and ADLER, ART
"ND PRUiDENcE (1937) pp. 250-259.
4. I am not at all sure that I have penetrated through his psychoanalytic terminology to
the heart of Professor Glueck's reasonable theory, and it may be more novel and subtle
than I suppose. Stated more fully it is something like this: Human conduct and personality
are realized and directed by two streams of influence, stimulation by the environment and
selection of the environment. Environmental elements are introjected into the human peronality and, according to its peculiarities, beocme part of its vital being by some process
which is as yet a mystery. But individuals differ in the quality of their introjective
capacity and in their gifts and weaknesses; every person has his breaking point; and as
it is made increasingly difficult by raising social demands or through social stress or neglect
for men to conform their impulses to legal requirements, more and more men will commit
crimes. (pp. 177-180)
5. For a discussion of attempts to control crime by procedures based upon this and
like commonplaces about human nature and behavior, and of what is known about their
efficacy, see MIcmuL & ADLER, op. cit., cs. VII-VIII and pp. 400-1.
6. It is true that he says that we are beginning to learn something about the internal
and external pressures at work in the determination of human behavior. (p. 181) But If
he means more by this than I attribute to him, it appears to be inconsistent with what he
has previously said about the state of our knowledge of the etiology of crime. See pp.
108-9, 175-180.
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to control crime. But since it has not itself enlarged our knowledge of the factors
entering into criminality or of their interrelationships, or increased our capacity to
control them, these new efforts to prevent crime can hardly be more reliable or
dependable than the old. Professor Glueck's faith in them would therefore appear
to be justified only by the consideration that the more varied, comprehensive and
systematic are our attempts to control crime, the greater the number of possible
causal factors at which they are directed, the greater is the chance that some of them
will hit their marks.
However, he takes the position that whether or not the social reforms which
he proposes will result in the diminution of crime, they will surely make for a better
society and, hence, that they should in any event be undertaken in the interests
of justice. The point is an excellent rhetorical one, but it seems to me that unless
he makes it only for its rhetorical effect he either denies the faith which he has
previously expressed in the preventive efficacy of these reforms or else misconceives
the nature of political justice. ly point is that political and social arrangements
which are not at all adapted to the end of crime prevention cannot be means to the
creation of a just society; if they serve that end they are just; if they disserve it
they are unjust; and if they neither serve nor disserve it they are indifferent from
the point of view of justice. For a society is just precisely to the degree that it
provides for all its members the external conditions of the good life and develops and
implements their varying capacities to live that sort of life. In the ideally just
society, which would be just because composed of just men, there would be no crime;
men who live well do not commit crimes. Every effort to make men good is necessarily an effort to prevent crime although it has, of course, a much larger purpose;
and every effort to prevent crime is necessarily an effort to make them better than
they might otherwise be.
Professor Glueck also finds that Justice suffers from a diseased legal order. He
holds that just as our chief concern with crime in the larger social order should
be to prevent as many persons as possible from becoming criminals, so our chief
concern with it in the smaller legal order should be to reforni as many as posible
of those who nevertheless become criminals. But criminals cannot be reformed unless they are caught and convicted, and Professor Glueck is convinced that Justice
does not catch and convict as many criminals as she should. This is because the
officials who conduct her affairs are on the whole incompetent or corrupt and because
capable and honest officials are frustrated by the inadequate organization and equipment with which they are provided, by archaic constitutional provisions and procedural rules which regulate their activities, and by the complex and creaking legal
machinery by which the guilt or innocence of those whom they charge with crime
must be determined. Professor Glueck therefore prescribes numerous changes in the
legal order designed to improve the moral and intellectual qualities of officials and
to facilitate the apprehension and conviction of criminals. Now while I agree that
Justice suffers and suffers seriously from these disorders, I fear that Professor
Glueck's preoccupation with the seamy side of the administration of the criminal
law may lead laymen to believe them to be more extensive and critical than they
really are. For even if the congeries of legal institutions and activities which be
personifies as Justice can be regarded from any point of view as a single organism,
there are surely forty-nine such organisms in this country, and only a few of them
have been examined clinically. While these examinations have revealed conditions
symptomatic of the disorders which Professor Glueck specifies, it is nevertheless a
genuine question whether those organisms which have not yet been studied suffer,
or suffer as badly, from the same maladies. 7 Indeed, it is also questionable whether
7. Professor Glueck's account of the organization, personnel and activities of the agencies
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those which have been examined are as sick as they once were, since none of them
has been kept under constant observation. 8 Moreover, while there is reason to believe that too many criminals now escape, in the nature of things Justice will never
be able to catch all of them or to convict all who are caught; and it is impossible
to say what proportion of them she ought to catch and convict. And while there is
also reason to believe that some criminals now go free because the legal apparatus
makes it difficult to apprehend and convict them, it does so because there are other
things which we hold even dearer than catching and convicting criminals. To what
extent it is possible to make it easier for officials to catch and convict criminals without sacrificing these other values, is a very difficult question upon which men may
reasonably disagree, as Professor Glueck's excellent analysis of the problem of unreasonable searches and seizures discloses.
Criminals who are caught and convicted cannot be reformed unless they are dealt
with for the right purpose and in the right ways; Professor Glueck also finds that
Justice suffers from an inadequate and outmoded criminal law which requires them
to be dealt with for wrong purposes and in wrong ways. As he sees our criminal law,
it is in the main based upon the notion that most persons are absolutely free to commit or not to commit crimes as they choose; consequently, if they choose to do so
it is because their wills are vicious and they should therefore be held responsible for
their criminal behavior and punished according to the viciousness of their wills, He
therefore regards the criminal law as unscientific because based upon a naive concep.
tion of freedom of will from which responsibility is assumed to flow and which leads
to excessive emphasis upon "criminal intent" both in defining crimes and in fixing
penalties. He also regards it as inconsistent because based upon conflicting penocorrectional philosophies which lead to inconsistencies in the purposes for which criminals are treated and in the methods by which they are treated: criminals are treated
by punitive and by non-punitive methods; they are sentenced to imprisonment for
fixed terms and for indeterminate terms; punishment serves the end of vengeance
chiefly but it also serves the ends of retribution, expiation, retaliation, incapacitation,
deterrence and reformation. Professor Glueck therefore prescribes a new code of
criminal law which should be predicated on "one or a few underlying social-ethical
principles" 9 and have the reformation of criminals as its chief end.
engaged in detecting crimes, in arresting and prosecuting persons accused of crime, or In
determining their guilt or innocence, is based principally on surveys of various aspects of
the administration of the criminal law in Cleveland, Missouri, Illinois, New York, Chicago,
Philadelphia, Georgia, Baltimore and Boston. Most of these investigations were made
prior to 1930 and most of them were concerned with conditions as they existed in very
large cities or metropolitan centers. Professor Glueck presents the results of these studies
as typical of the conditions which exist today throughout the country; the exceptions are a
"saving grace." (See pp. 62-3, 173) Now while they may be typical, he surely does not
demonstrate that they are. Indeed, he himself sums up what such investigations have
taught us in these words: "The recent investigations of police and prosecutors' offices, courts
and prisons, have given us some insight into the anatomy and pathology of these bodies,
less into their physiology." (pp. 108-9)
8. Professor Glueck presents some evidence that the conditions found to exist from
two to fifteen years ago, as the result of the investigations referred to In the preceding
footnote, still exist, but he relies chiefly in that regard upon an "historic sense" which should
cause us to "know how deep-rooted are the evils" and "how slow is fundamental reform."
(p. 204) While his opinion that these conditions persist may be correct, it Is not Clear
to me that an historic sense is a sufficiently substantial basis for it.
9. p. 212.
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It is with this part of his diagnosis that I find myself in sharpest disagreement,
although I quite agree that our criminal law is in need of reexamination and revision.
Seen as he sees it, it is, as he says, "like the temple of some insane architect,"' 0
but I think that his vision has been distorted by his failure to realize that a body of
criminal law can be seen from different points of view, from that of the ends which
it ought to serve, an ethical and political question, or from that of the ends which
it was intended to serve, an historical question, or from that of the ends which it
in fact serves, a question of cause and effect which is very complicated because
a single legal device may serve many ends. Punishment, for example, may in fact
serve both the end of retribution and the end of the prevention of crime through
the intermediate ends of vengeance, incapacitation, deterrence and even of reformation,1 ' whatever the end it was intended to serve. It seems to me that Professor
Glueck never sees our own criminal law very clearly because he so often looks at it
from all these points of view at the same time. As far as I know, the great students
of our criminal law have been unanimously of the opinion that it ought to serve
the end of preventing crime and not the end of retribution or retaliation. Moreover, there is good reason to believe both that it was intended to 2 and does in
fact chiefly serve the end of prevention through deterrence. I think that Professor
Glueck's vision has also been distorted by his failure to realize that codes of criminal
law designed to serve quite different ends, retribution and deterrence or reformation
and deterrence, for example, will necessarily look very much alike.
I should like to offer another view of our criminal law, the view that one gets
when one looks at it through the eyes of its great students to whom it has appeared
to be neither the perfection of reason nor the work of a madman. It makes behavior
criminal, which it is desirable and possible to prevent; its major purpose is to deter
men from engaging in such behavior. It proceeds upon the notion, held by Professor
Glueck himself, that most men are capable, although in varying degrees, of "consciously and purposefully guiding their behavior to conform to legal sanctioas"; 23
and that most men and even most "lunatics are usually capable of being influenced
by ordinary motives, such as the prospect of punishment'; 14 but that there are some
persons who are not, because of a youthful or pathological lack of understanding
or self-control. Consequently, to paraphrase Holmes, 1 the law threatens all persons of the first sort with certain pains if they commit crimes, intending thereby
to give them a new motive for not committing them; if they nevertheless persist
10. p. 104.
11. For example, while our criminal law is probably intended to satisfy whatever popular desire there is to be avenged upon actual criminals who commit 'particularly seocking
crimes, it is also intended to serve the end of deterring potential criminals from committing
crimes, schocking or otherwise. I do not see how it can be said either that it was intended
to or that it does in fact chiefly serve the former end. Punishment is a means adapted to
both ends; the severer the penalty the better it is adapted to both; the crime3 which
arouse the greatest popular indignation are on the whole those which we are most eager
to prevent; and it is precisely in the case of those crimes that the severest peniltie3 are
usually administered.
12. This is indicated by Coke's statement in 1603 in Beverley's Case, 4 Coke 124b, that
"the punishment of a man who is deprived of reason and understanding cannot be an examp e to oth!ers" (Ialics mine.)
13. p. 97.
14. The quotation is from Kenny. Professor Glueck quotes him to that effect with
approval.
15. TaL Commo-'7 LAw, p. 46.
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in doing so, it has to inflict the pains in order that others whom it hopes to deter
may continue to take its threats seriously. The severity of the penalties varies, not
with perverseness of will, but with the harmfulness of criminal behavior and the importance of preventing it most completely, the dangerousness of criminals and the
desirability of incapacitating them most thoroughly, and popular attitudes towards
different sorts of crimes and criminals and the necessity of respecting them in order
to avoid nullification; these factors in large part account for the emphasis of the
criminal law upon "criminal intent," that is, the knowledge, the purposes and the
motives of those who commit crimes. These and similar considerations also account
for the fact that the criminal law has come to serve the end of reformation as well
as of deterrence: (1) while deterrence still remains the dominant end of treatment,
some attempt, however feeble and unintelligent, is made to reform the more promising of those who are punished that others may be deterred, and (2) in the case of
youthful and some other types of offenders reformation rather than deterrence has
become the dominant end of treatment.
Professor Glueck also regards our criminal law as ineffective because it does not
succeed either in reforming actual or in deterring potential criminals; he believes
that if its dominant end were reformation it would not only have greater reformative but, probably, greater deterrent efficacy; that it would, in short, prevent more
crime.16 And he regards it as unjust because since society as well as the criminal
is responsible for his criminality, it is not just to punish him even for the sake
of deterrence.1 7 It is therefore required in the interests not only of "science" and
consistency but of crime prevention and justice that reformation be made the principal end of the treatment of criminals.
How much crime the criminal law now prevents and how much it would prevent,
whether more or less, if reformation were its chief object, are difficult and, I fear,
unanswerable questions. It is quite clear that it does not now deter all potential
criminals from becoming actual criminals; each year many of them do so. It is
also quite clear that a very large, perhaps the larger, proportion of actual criminals
who suffer imprisonment do not thereafter desist from crime. What is not clear
is how many more potential criminals would commit crimes but for the fear of
punishment' s or why so many actual criminals become recidivists, whether as the
result of imprisonment or for other reasons. 19 But we may nevertheless doubt that
the code of criminal law which Professor Glueck proposes would have greater preventive efficacy than our present criminal law; we have reason to think that the resuit would be a loss in deterrent efficacy without a corresponding gain in reformative
efficacy. In the first place, there is ground for believing that "appeal to fear has
some socially desirable effect as a deterrent," 20 although we do not know how much;
16.

pp. 5, 214, 233.

17.

pp. 4, 5, 214.

18. "Nobody," Professor Glueck says, "can say what the effect of existing methods Is
on the 'rest of us'." (p. 209) He also says that thd development of statistical tchnique
has enabled investigators to draw only some rough generalizations about the results of
peno-correctional treatment. (p. 108) Yet he does not hesitate to assert elsewhere that
we know that the criminal law is bankrupt "so far as its failure to reform criminals Is concerned and also, though perhaps to a less extent, as a general deterrent to wrongdoing."
(p. 214)
19. Cf. pp. 61 and 202. Nevertheless, what we know of human nature and of the ways
in which prisoners are treated justifies Professor Glueck in asserting that the prison must
bear a large share of the responsibility for recidivism; he makes out an unanswerable caso
for more intelligent and humane prison administration.
20. p. 202.
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that what men fear is pain and that the greater it is the more they fear it; that punitive treatment is therefore better adapted to deterrence than non-punitive treatment, but that, on the other hand, non-punitive treatment is better adapted to reformation. In the next place, there is reason for believing that even less is known
about how to reform criminals than about how to prevent criminality; as Professor
Glueck says, there are but a "few bottles of peno-correctional medicine" and if a
criminologist were asked whether "one type of punishment or correction is more effective than another," he would be put "in a difficult position."21 Nor do I think
that considerations of justice require that reformation be substituted for deterrence
as the dominant end of treatment. Whatever the social roots of crime, criminals are
at least partly responsible for their criminality; other equally disadvantaged persons
do not become criminals. Consequently, it cannot be absolutely but only relatively
unjust to punish them for the sake of deterrence; it is relatively unjust to do so to
the extent that society fails in its duty to them. Moreover, there is another and, in
view of our ignorance of how to reform criminals, perhaps a better way of attempting
to correct that injustice than by making reformation the principal end of treatment,
and that is by constant effort to prevent them from becoming criminals, that is, by
unremitting attempts, to create a just society.
Finally, Professor Glueck finds that Justice suffers from popular unenlightenment.
His book should do much to correct that condition if laymen will only read it. Its
scope required him to speak to them not only as criminologist but as ethicist, political
scientist and jurist as well. As criminologist, he has spoken to them clearly and, on
the whole, with great wisdom; I fear that he has been less clear and less wise in
his other capacities.
JEROME MICMELt

SaM ADAms. Pioneer in Propaganda. By John C. Miller. Boston: Little, Brown &
Co. 1936. pp. 447. $4.00.
When John Adams arrived in France, 1778, as the Minister of the New Republic,
he was asked 1 if he were the "Famous Adams." Sam, not John, was at that time,
in Europe, the "Famous Adams."
A graduate of Harvard College and a serious student of the philosophy of John
Locke, Sam Adams early began to agitate for the redress of Colonial grievances,
and finally for independence. Though a Puritan in religion, and taking his religion
seriously all his life, he yet found it possible to reconcile his conscience to the use
of mobs to attain his purpose. If the English Government of Colonial days had the
broad imperial outlook which it has today, all America would still be a British
Dominion. The American people of that day were predominantly loyal to England.
But the English Government never missed a chance to give provocation, and Sam
Adams was always there ready to take advantage of every blunder. The Stamp Act,
the Boston Massacre, The Townshend Duties, all were so much fuel to feed the fire he
had started. He was an astute politician, pretending to follow when in reality he led.
Finally, when the Declaration of Independence was promulgated, the people were
prepared for it.
21. pp. 125, 109. Space will not permit me to develop this point further. I have dealt
with it at greater length in my review of ON Ttou-u'v Juvms=, Dat.n:QuTs by S.
&E. Glueck in (1935) 44 YA.LE L. J. 903.
t Professor of Law, Columbia University, School of Law.

1. P. 344.
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It was necessary for Sam to have a philosophy underlying his propaganda; and,
since positive law offered him no aid, he fell back on natural law.2 Every movement
of the Government which he opposed, he denounced as contrary to natural law.
Sam Adams undoubtedly was a great force in bringing about the Declaration
of Independence. But why Tom Paine and his "Common Sense" are not credited
by the author with some influence upon the movement, it is not easy to understand,
After the Declaration of Independence Sam Adams was superstes Sid. True, he
lived on into the next century; but, for the rest of his life, he was mostly a nuisance,
and an anachronism. Yet he was, and will ever remain, the "Famous Adams," the
man who made the American Revolution inevitable.
The author has a great theme, and handles it well. We have given only the high
spots of the story, which have long been known. The great contribution which the
author here makes to the antecedents of the Declaration of Independence is the
mass of detail about the methods and persons involved in bringing it about.
The sub-title is significant. This book demonstrates that this country is not immune from propaganda or from revolution, and it suggests a warning particularly applicable to the present time. For today we have in our midst propagandists as
clever, as persistent and as unscrupulous as Sam Adams. They, too, aim at revolution. The revolution of Sam Adams has had very happy results. The revolution
now on the horizon would destroy all the institutions which the prosperous hold
dear.
This is, indeed, a biography with a lesson.
JOHN X. PYNE, S.J.r

A

TREATISE ON TIE LAW OF CONTRACTS. By Samuel Williston. Revised Edition,
Volume III. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1936. pp. xii, 1725-2579. $85.00 per
set of 8 volumes.

The two previous volumes of the new edition of "Williston on Contracts" have
been reviewed in these columns by Professors Bacon and Finn, who have pointed
out that Williston's work, valuable in its original form, has been improved and brought
to date in this new edition by Mr. Williston. and George J. Thompson.
The third volume deals with the performance of contracts, including their interpretation; usage and custom; the doctrine of conditions and of dependency and independence of promises.
When "Williston on Contracts" appeared in its original form, some sixteen years
ago, the present reviewer stated in the columns of the New York Law Journal, that
it would prove of great practical value to lawyers. A short time after reviewing the
book there came up in my office a very interesting question in connection with the
admissibility of parol evidence to establish that common words may have been given
a peculiar meaning by customary trade usage. 1
Under the contract in that case, defendants bought, and plaintiff agreed to deliver,
"1800 tons of Number 1 heavy books and magazines, guaranteed free from ground
wood" (italics are mine). The defendant claimed that the legal and necessary meaning of the words "free from ground wood" was that there was to be no ground
wood in the stock delivered. The Trial Court (Justice James O'Malley, now a mem2.

P. 243.

t

Regent, Fordham University, School of Law.

Author, Tnm MIND (1925).

1. Gumbinsky Bros. Co. v. Smalley, 203 App. Div. 661, 197 N. Y. Supp. 530 (decided
December 22, 1922, aff'd without opinion, 235 N. Y. 619, 139 N. E. 758 (1923)].
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ber of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First Department) permitted
the plaintiff, my client, to prove a universal custom or usage in the trade as to the
meaning of the words "free from ground wood," over defendant's objection and exception. The witnesses testified that there was an established custom and usage in
the trade whereby that description was understood to mean paper containing not to
exceed 3% of ground wood. The Appellate Division, by a bench divided four to
one, and the unanimous Court of Appeals, held that the ruling of the Trial Judge
was correct.
In the brief written on behalf of plaintiff-respondent, reliance was placed upon the
discussion of this subject in "Williston on Contracts," citing and quoting Sec. 650 as
follows:
"A very learned author, the leading living authority on contract law, Profes-or Williston, has stated:
"'But there are now numerous decisions (not all of them of recent date) where words with
a clear normal meaning have been shown by usage to bear a meaning which nothing in the
context would suggest. This is not only true of technical terms, but of language, which
at least on its face has no peculiar or technical significance; though even today it is still
occasionally said by courts that usage cannot control words having 'a definite legoal meaning'; or cannot be used to interpret a contract unless there is an uncertainty on the face of
the instrument. So it is often said also that usage is admissible to explain what is doubtful
but never to contradict what is plain. If this statement means that usage is not admitted
to contradict a meaning apparently plain if proof of usage were excluded (and this is what
the statement seems naturally to mean), it is inconsistent with many decisions and wrong
on principle'."
The Appellate Division, in affirming the judgment, writing by the late learned
Justice Greenbaum, quoted this language of Professor Williston at length.
In the new edition, the Gumbinshy case, supra, is cited and quoted in Sec. 650, p.
1876, footnote 10, showing that the editors have not overlooked the recent cases.
Reference must be made also to the able opinion of the late Judge Hough, writing
for the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in Nicoll v. Pittsvein
Coal Co.,2 in which the Court again gave approval of the statement of Professor
Williston, above quoted. In the Nicoll case, the contract was for 50,000 gross tons
of coal, to be shipped in equal monthly instalments during a year. The Court held
that it was competent to prove a usage in the trade that, when there was a shortage,
deliveries by the seller among his buyers were apportioned pro rata. Judge Hough, in
following Wiliston's statement of the law, said in part:
" . . . Indeed, when tradesmen say or write anything, they are perhaps without present
thought on the subject, writing on top of a mass of habits or usages which they take as matter of course. So (with Prof. Williston) we think that anyone contracting with knowledge
of a usage will naturally say nothing about the matter, unless desirous of excluding its
operation; if he does wish to exclude, he will say so in express terms. Williston, Contracts,
Sec. 653. Courts for a long time have rightly been influenced by this belief, until a survey
of decisions leads the same learned author to conclude, as we do, that usage has been more
potent than any other -collateral parol matter to affect, if not control, contractual interpretation. Section 654. . .
The Nicoll case is also found in the new edition, Sec. 650, p. 1876, footnote 10.
Here is practical, concrete, vital testimony of the value of "Williston on Contracts." What more can be said in reviewing any book?
"Williston on Contracts" has passed the acid test.
I. MAUICE Wonusrnt
2. Nicoll v. Pittsvein Coal Co., 269 Fed. 968 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920).
t Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
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THE HISTORY OF QUASI-CONTRACT IN ENGLISH LAW. By R. M. Jackson. Cambridge:
At the University Press; New York: The Macmillan Company. 1937. pp. Xxxi, 134.
$3.75.
This very technical work' will be of value to those legal scholars who regard the
historical technique as indispensable for an adequate comprehension of law. and a
true appreciation of its present state. According to Dr. Hazeltine, this book "is in
fact the first detailed account of an important historical development, continuous from
the time of Bracton to our own day, to make its appearance in the literature of English law." 2 It is a demonstration of the possibilities of analytical historical jurisprudence.
After adopting Professor Winfield's 3 conception of quasi-contract, as one which
"connotes liability, not exclusively referable to any other head of the law, imposed
upon a particular person to pay money to another particular person on the ground
of unjust benefit," 4 Mr. Jackson 5 traces the evolution of the Common Law idea of
quasi-contract in terms of a category lying between contract and tort. The most
essential element of quasi-contract is shown to be a duty imposed by positive law,
regardless of agreement,6 so that actually, quasi-contract is in some respects more
delictual than contractual. This anomaly is explained on the ground that contract
and quasi-contract were bracketed together for the convenience of the adjective law,
and for the preservation of the Justinian division of obligations into contractual,
and quasi-contractual, and delictual, quasi-delictual.7 This classification was borrowed
by the early English legalists, such as Bracton, Britton, and Fleta, and preserved
in later centuries. In quasi-contract, the obligor is regarded "as if" he had entered
into a contract with the obligee.
The history of quasi-contract has been divided into two parts, namely, the period
prior to the rise of the action of indebitatus assumpsit, in the seventeenth century,
and the era thereafter. This symmetry of pattern is preserved by means of an equal
number of sections in each part.8 The key actions in the first period were account and
debt, 9 which made possible the recovery of money paid by mistake. 10 The action
of debt eventually superseded that of account, which withered because of the assump1. Only the Common Law phases of the subject are covered, not the Chancery aspects,
see p. xiii. There is an excellent preface by Harold D. Hazeltine, Litt. D., F. B. A., of the
Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law, Downing Professor of the Laws of England, at Cambridge
University, and editor of the Cambridge Studies in English Legal History. Mr. Jackson's
book is the most recent publication in this series.
2.

P. ix.

3. Jackson's study of the history of quasi-contract complements Winfield's wellknown
work on modem tort law, namely, THE PROVINCz or T'E LAW Or TORT (1931).
4. P. xxiii. At pp. xxi, xxii, Jackson writes: "We can describe quasi-contract in rough
outline, as consisting of liability not based on tort or contract, using the word 'contract'
in its common meaning of an enforceable agreement."
5. Mr. R. M. Jackson, MA., LL.B., is Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Judicature, and
Lecturer in Law at Cambridge University.
6. P. 129. The propriety of the name "quasi-contract" is discussed at length in Section
32.

7. P. xi.
8. There are indexes, respectively of Year Books, Cases, and Statutes. There is also a
list of modem authorities referred to by abbreviated titles.
9. Pp. x, xi.
10. P. 6
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tion of jurisdiction over accounting by Chancery." In the second period, there arose
the action of idebitatus assumpsit,:2 which was "obviously the most important
event in the history of quasi-contract."' 3 This action was extended so as to include
-quasi-contracts.' 4
In indebitatus assumpsit, there was an allegation that the defendant "being indebted
did promise.' 135 This action was made concurrent with debt. 0 At first, it was
necessary not only to prove the existence of the debt, but also an express promise to
pay it.' 7 But in Slade's Case's , it was settled that the action of indebitatusassumpsit would be allowable wherever there was a simple contract debt, because a promise
of payment would be implied from the debt itself. Nevertheless, the theory of Slade's
Case was consensual or contractual. It was not until the end of the seventeenth
century that indebitatus assumpsit was, held to be concurrent with debt through a
fiction, in cases where there was no justification in actuality for implying a promise,
or a consideration,' 9 but where such implication was necessitated by public policy
or natural justice, as where a sum of money was due by statute.O In such cases, the
right to recover was apparent. But it could not be based upon a tort theory, because
there was no violation of a right good against the whole world. The stiff system
of pleadings of the Common Law necessitated the preservation of the categories of
remedies in contract and tort. The English courts decided that such rights should
be regarded as quasi-contractual, instead of quasi-delictual.
ir. Jackson has traced
this whole evolutionary process carefully 5nd in detail.
Mr. Jackson brings out that when he emphasizes the various subdivisions of quasicontractual obligations, rather than the remedies through which these equities were
enforceable, he is approaching an ancient situation with a modem mentality,2 ' for
the theory of the medieval English Common Law was that the writ gave the right, not
vice versa. Yet the main tenor of the book is not jurisprudential. It is principally a
citation of a series of cases and rules of law placed in chronological order, characterized
by juristic realism. Indeed Mr. Jackson eschews the fabrication of theories or doctrines of quasi-contract, and attacks the efforts of LangdellU2 at transcendentalism.
For the most part, the growth of quasi-contract is explained by Mr. Jackson as an
empirical matter,23 despite occasional suggestions which indicate that underlying
the whole law of quasi-contracts there is a vitalizing equitable philosophy.
Perhaps the most jurisprudential part of the book is that which deals with the
influence of Lord Justice Mansfield, who "by turning the minds of lawyers from the
theory of fictitious contract to a theory based on considerations of natural justice
and aequum et bonumr introduced into the study of quasi-contract certain notions of
an equitable character which, still of influence, have given to the obligation, from
some points of view, the appearance of an equitable institution enforced by common

12.

11.

Pp. xii, 36.
P. 39 et seq.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

P. 39.
Pp. xii, 41 et seq.
P. 42.
P. 40 et seq.
P. 42.

18. 4 Co. Rep. 92 b (1603).
19. Pp. 40, 117.

20. P. 43.
21. P. 3.
22. Pp. 32-34.
23. Pp. 34, 120.
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law remedies." 2 4 Lord Mansfield's theory of quasi-contract is perhaps most in accord with a scholastic of theophilosophical jurisprudence of a natural law. Mr.
Jackson has well brought out that in the celebrated case of Moses v. Macferlalt,25
Lord Mansfield was correct in stating that the formalistic theory of a contract,
fictitiously implied by law, was itself dependent for its validity upon an anterior material authority, called "aequurm et bonum," 2 6 i.e., the natural law in the language
of the scholastics.
It has been stated by some jurists that the present prevailing view of the law of
quasi-contract, which has substituted hard and fast rules for Lord Mansfield's concept of "natural justice," is irreconcilable with the great judge's doctrine.2 7 But Mr.
Jackson ably shows 2s that a natural law jurisprudence does not militate against the
working out of specific, technical rules, for the effectuation of the idealogy of "natural
justice," called "public policy" by the author, which "requires ill gotten gains to be restored, but . . . also finality in law suits."29 The effect of the modern positivistic
sociological school of juridical thought may, perhaps, be discerned, in so far as it
may have caused Mr. Jackson to choose the phrase "public policy" in place of "natural law."
The author has acknowledged"0 his great indebtedness to American legal scholar.
ship, and has stressed the powerful influence which the writing of the American Jus.
tice, Joseph Story, had upon the English courts, during the middle of the nineteenth
century, in the matter of quasi-contract.31 On the other hand, American legal historians have already begun to cite Mr. Jackson's work with approval.32 This praiseworthy reciprocity among Anglo-American jurists must continue, if there is ever to
be an adequate unfolding of the history and philosophy of the Common Law.
In the opinion of the reviewer, the shortcomings of the book seem to be all in
reference to form. These include, first, the lack of sufficient generalization; secondly,
the placing in the text of too many cases, which might have been included in the
footnotes, with the result that reading is sometimes difficult; thirdly, insufficient
demarcation between the provinces of Chancery and the Common Law, respectively,
in reference to quasi-contract; and fourthly, the apparent absence of an attempt to
relate the various sections by adequate orientating transitional paragraphs. But these
adverse opinions are more that overbalanced, first, by the originality of the book,
resulting from a careful examination of all the pertinent Year Books, cases, and
statutes, and of the primary sources relied upon by Mr. Jackson's predecessors in
research in regard to the history of quasi-contract; secondly, by its thoroughness and
insight; thirdly, by its unique and pioneering qualities; and fourthly, by the effective interpreting use of Roman law. In virtue of this splendid piece of work, it is
to be hoped that Mr. Jackson will, in the very near future, further enrich the literature of the law of quasi-contract by his "promised work on the principles of the
present day law" 33 of this subject.
BRENDAN

F. BROWNIf

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

P. xiv.
2 Burr. 1005 (1760).
P. 119.
Pp. xiv, 117 et seq.
P. 118 et seq.
P. 121.
Such as Ames and Langdell.
P. 112.

32.

Thus see RADw, HANDBOOK OF ANGLo-AmmeAN LEGAL. HIsToRY (1936)

33.

t

See pp. xxiv, 14, 19, 23, 32, 36, 40, 42, 75, 129.

Pp. xix, xxiii.
Instructor in Law, Catholic University, School of Law.
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CASES ON CREDrr TRANSACTIONS.

Paul: West Publishing Co.

By Wesley A. Sturges.

1936. pp. xiii, 1082.

(Second edition). St.

$6.50.

This book contains a collection of cases and'materials dealing with the rights and
privileges, duties and liabilities, attaching upon the failure to perform obligations
arising from borrowing and sales contracts, when the performance is secured by
personal responsibility or collateral security. The division and treatment is similar
to that appearing in the First Edition. The author's division of the matter should
aid tremendously 'in presentation. His first chapter is entitled "Accommodation
Contracts." It contains, for the most part, cases and matter wherein a purchaser
has given his personal responsibility or a third party has extended his personal
liability to secure performance by another. This is to be distinguished from the
matter contained in Chapter 2, which contains, mainly, matter wherein collateral
security has been given to secure performance. The material appearing in Chapter
3 is properly separated from that contained in the first two chapters. It deals
largely with instances wherein the vendor has temporarily financed his vendee and
includes cases wherein the financing is done through the medium of trust receipts.
Because of the statutory control in this field the author wisely deals with it as sid
generis. Logically the question of enforcement of remedies is the subject of the
last chapter.
The inclusion of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, National Bankruptcy
Act, Uniform Real Estate Mortgage Act, Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act, and the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act is desirable. It facilitates their use by the student
and makes readily convenient the acquisition of information needed in order to deal
accurately with the cases and material contained in the body of the book. It is
submitted that the inclusion of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act would have been
equally desirable.
The author contemplates hourly lectures, three times each week, for the school
year. The matter contained in the cases and notes should produce lively discussion
for this class-room period.
This book is of course designed for use in a school which has wholly or partially
abandoned the long recognized division of courses for the purposes of legal study
and the resulting curriculum. It contains cases appearing in case-books upon the
subjects of Bankruptcy, Mortgages, and Suretyship. But it goes much further than
that,--it, according to the preface, is being used to give a course, which "has displaced the separate courses in Bankruptcy, Mortgages and Suretyship which were
formerly given." Does this book contain such matter as would render courses in
these three subjects unnecessary; as would render the giving of them redundant, or
mere intensification of principle contained therein? It cannot be said that the
matter contained in the book is a satisfactory substitute for a course in bankruptcy.
It devotes a total of 66 pages to "Insolvency and Bankruptcy." The cases contained
therein deal with Sections 63a, 57i, 70a, 47a, 60a, 60b, 64b, and 77B. But there
is much more to the study of bankruptcy than the subject matter of the above
sections, to wit,--provable claims, the rights of sureties, the property which the
trustee takes, preferences, and reorganizations, even though these matters are dealt
with at some length. A course in bankruptcy should, in addition to the matter
referred to, contain cases dealing with the essential allegations of the petition, the
required qualifications of petitioning creditors, the acts of bankruptcy, the trustee,
the discharge, and much more matter under Section 77B. It would seem advisable
also to include matter dealing with the constitutionality of the recent amendments
to the Act.
May the course in Mortgages be abandoned because the curriculum has a course
called "Credit Transactions"? The book does not cover the capacity of parties to
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a mortgage, what interests may be the subject of a mortgage, equitable mortgages,
future advances, recording and its effect, or assignments of mortgages. These matters
would seem essential to any adequate substitute for a course in mortgages.
The course in suretyship could be safely abandoned. The cases and materials in
this book provide excellent and fully adequate suretyship matter. The author's
approach is mainly from the surety or guaranty point of view.
The cases and materials used by him form an excellent "spring-board" for profitable
and penetrating class-room discussion.
Mr. Sturges has used an exceedingly efficacious method to excite the interest and
enthusiasm of his students. His plan of varying the text case by stated questions
and reference to cases dealing with the question raised should form the necessary
vehicle of interest which will carry his students into the library. His questions
are incisive and yet practical. The use of excerpts from leading legal periodicals
should successfully draw the student to the source of the excerpt. Indeed the
author, throughout the entire book, has never lost sight of his fundamental purpose-the stimulation and maintenance of energetic and enthusiastic student interest.
EUGENE J. KEEx
By Thurman W. Arnold and Fleming
James, Jr. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1936. pp. xxvii, 869. $6.00.

CASES ON TRIAIs, JUDGMENTS AND APPEALs.

The authors of this book, professors of law at Yale Law School, have felt that
not enough attention has been devoted in the ordinary law school curriculum, to
training the student to meet the arguments and procedural situations with which he
may be suddenly confronted on the trial of a case. To make up this deficiency the
authors have assigned material in this book to train the law student in the proper
"argumentative technique" of a trial attorney. The authors approach their subject
by devoting the first chapter of the book to "The Mystical Conception of a Court."
In this chapter a point is developed, among others, which is concurrently much in
the public mind, namely that the courts cannot properly perform their functions in
our system of government unless "the ideal of an independent judiciary" is preserved.
Having commenced their thesis by bringing out what the proper concept of a court
should be, the authors proceed: to demonstrate that a court cannot speak with author.
ity unless it sits at the proper time and place and has before it a controversy which
is cognizable by it. The second chapter deals with the "Time, Place and Subject
Matter of Judicial Decisions."
The place of the trial depends largely upon whether or not the court can obtain
jurisdiction of the defendant by service of its process upon him. As a natural sequence to the second chapter, the authors in the third chapter devote themselves to
the "Ritual of the Commencement of a Suit." Under this heading there is discussed
the form of the summons and the different methods of service, personal and substituted, on individuals, partnerships and corporations.
The authors recognize that an attorney before he brings his suit must be prepared
to put forth a "plausible argumentative answer" to the following questions: (1) Has
the court jurisdiction of the subject matter? (2) Has the court jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant? (3) Has the suit been brought in the proper venue? To
answer this last question Chapter 4 is given over to "The Place of Trial of Civil
Actions," embracing within its scope general rules as to venue and also the proper
t
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place of trial in particular situations, as for instance where the question arises between different States, and between State and Federal Courts.
Sometimes the commencement and trial of the action and the subsequent rendering
of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff may be simply "lost motion" becamuse of the
inability to enforce and collect the judgment. This unsatisfactory result may perhaps be prevented by taking certain preliminary steps prior to the entry of judgment and so Chapter 5 treats of the powers of a court to seize property prior to
judgment. This involves a discussion of the extraordinary remedies of "attachment"
and "garnishment."
The judgment in the ordinary course of events is enforced by an "execution" issued against the property of the defendant. The "execution" and the "supplementary proceedings" in aid of the execution are covered in Chapter 6 of the book.
The successful trial of the action depends to a great extent to the preliminary
preparation or "spade work" which is done by the attorney in advance of the trial.
He is given remedies which enable him to ascertain the case he has to meet on the
part of his opponent, such as the motion to make more definite and certain and the
motion for a bill of particulars. It is equally important for the attorney to prepare
proof in support of his own case and in aid of this he is given two remedies of equitable origin, "Discovery against his Adversary and Depositions of Witnesses." All of
these remedies form the subject matter of Chapter 7 under the heading "Pre Trial
Devices for Preparation of a Case and Clarification of Issues."
On the trial of the action it is important for the trial attorney to have a proper
understanding of the distribution of power between judge and jury in determining the
issues raised on the trial. It may become expedient and necessary from the standpoint of the trial attorney to withdraw from the province of the jury the right to pass
on some or all of the issues. There are various devices in the form of motions made
before or after verdict which may be used to accomplish this purpose, such as the
motion for a "nonsuit" or a "directed verdict" and the motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial which are dwelt upon in Chapter 8 under the title "Methods
of Controlling Jury."
Chapter 9, the final chapter of the book, is devoted to the subject of "Appeals."
In their introduction to this chapter the authors point out that the number of
decisions in the digest under the title "Appeal and Error" is staggering. It is larger
than any other subject and the reaction of the student is one of confusion. The central idea underlying appellate practice is not complicated however and it is the authors
opinion that if it is briefly and simply described it will furnish the student with a
background by means of which he may read and understand the appellate practice
of his own state. Commencing with "Appeal" as distinguished from the "Writ of
Error" and then taking up in turn the "Record on Appeal," the "final judgment
rule" and the disposition of the case by the Appellate Court, the chapter is then
concluded with a discussion of Appeals from administrative tribunals such as "commissions," as distinguished from appeals from "Judicial tribunals."
The form in which this case book is gotten up is excellent. It illustrates the modem
tendency of trying to make a case book something more than a mere reprint of se.
lected cases and statutes. At the beginning of each chapter the authors have an
"Introduction" outlining the problems which they hope to solve in that particular chapter. Interposed between the decisions and the statutes are "comments" by the
authors, reflecting on the holdings of the different courts and their bearing on the
solution of the matters under discussion. The authors have drawn their material not
only from the official reports of the different states and the selected statutes of different so-called code states, but also from such widely divergent sources as Holds.
worth's History of the Common Law and the New Yorker Magazine.
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The question of whether or not Procedure can best be taught in the law schools
by the use of a text book or from a case book is a controversial one. The main disadvantage of the case book is that the subject of procedure is so voluminous and the
time available for the teaching of the course is so limited that it is hard to cover
ground except by making heavy case assignments, only a portion of which can be discussed in the lecture room. The text book seems to afford a speedier vehicle for
covering the subject matter, at least in outline, than the case book.
To obtain the most satisfactory results from a case book such as this, "time should
not be of the essence." It should be contemplated taking up the study of procedure
in installments during the three or four years of the law school course. This book
the authors state in their preface is designed for a four hour course lasting one
semester. Its most effective use would be as part of a three point program in connection with the two companion courses of "pleading" and "motion practice."

EDWARD Q. CAIu
NEw YoRK C=rv.

PRACTiCE MANUAL. By Harold R. Medina, Edward Q. Carr and
John F. X. Finn. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 1936. pp. viii, 719. $5.00.

New York Civil Practice Manual succeeds a series of manuals compiled and published from time to time by experienced teachers of Pleading and Practice. Experience in the use of the earlier manuals appears to have disclosed some limitations
and to have suggested desirable additions, for this latest development in the evolutionary process clearly surpasses its predecessors. While the compilation is surprisingly compact, the selection of statutes and rules relating to procedure is almost
exhaustive. It would probably have satisfied David Dudley Field, who complained
that our first Code of Procedure was but "the fragment of 1848."
The 1936 edition of New York Civil Practice Manual contains, in their entirety,
the Civil Practice Act, the Rules of Civil Practice, the Surrogate's Court Act, the
New York City Court Act, and the New York City Municipal Court Code. In addition, excerpts from many chapters of the Consolidated Laws bearing directly or
indirectly upon civil procedure have been incorporated, including among others,
sections from the Arbitration Law, the Employers' Liability Act, the General Construction Law, the Vehicle and Traffic Law, and the Workmen's Compensation Law.
A substantial part of the manual is devoted to a comprehensive statement of Court
Rules. The editors, in taking cognizance of the numerous procedural changes effected
in 1936, have made the scope of the new legislation easily discernible by a table of
1936 amendments.
The practitioner, exasperated by the necessity of referring to numerous volumes
to ascertain the text of the various statutes relating to a single problem, will welcome this manual for its wealth of material under one cover. The student, desiring
quick and easy access to a civil practice manual for supplementing class-room discussion and the study of case-books and text-books, should welcome this manual
for the abundance of source material at a price commensurate with the work of
preparation. The Rules of the New York State Board of Law Examiners, which
appear at the end of the Court Rules, should meet a need of students who are
desirous of meeting all preliminary requirements for the bar examination.
The manual does not purport to set forth references to the adjudicated cases
construing the statutes and the rules. The editors make no pretense of offering
the manual as an exposition of the adjective law of the State of New York. But
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the subject matter has obviously been selected with a view to assisting law students and the younger members of the profession. It would perhaps be within the
scope of this objective, without transcending the limits of a civil practice manual,
to include in future editions a bibliography of works of reference to which the
student might quickly turn when he finds it necessary to look beyond the text of
the statutes and the rules for the purpose of determining their full significance.
It would no doubt add materially to the value of the manual if some device could
be employed to keep the manual abreast of new developments in the law during
the interim between publications of successive editions.
ALLEN B. FLOUTONt

THE ULTnrATE PowER. By Morris L. Ernst. New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co.,
Inc. 1937. pp. xv, 344. $3.00.
In view of the transcendent importance of the problem which the author undertakes to discuss and resolve, his book deserves a far sterner criticism for its relevant
omissions than for the many rather obvious weaknesses in the structure of the
affirmative thesis which it elaborates.
Adopting the usual short-sighted strategy of the overly enthusiastic protagonist of
a cause, the writer-whose sincerity we do not for one moment question-has ignored central and material facts in the totality of the situation out of which the
actual problem has developed. By reason of so doing he has posited for discussion, not the actual problem, but a purely supposititious one, and consequently, be
it carefully noted, 'an illegitimate one.' The carefully isolated object of attack
which the author proceeds valiantly and enthusiastically to overwhelm is, after all,
nothing but a straw-man of his own making-a mere figment of his imagination.
This makes the protagonist of such discussion a sort of twentieth century Don
Quixote.
When the earnest sober-thinking seeker after truth has waded through the whole
rather boresome elaboration he is in fact just exactly where he started-in the dark.
He has been given no opportunity to grasp and reflect upon an honest to goodness
two-sided presentation of the real objective problem. We take it to be the Eerious
bounden duty therefore of those who are genuinely concerned with the common
well-being to sternly reprobate this dangerous type of controversial discussion-only
too common in our day-whenever and as often as it sticks its head up since it
is essentially disintegrative and nullifying in its results.
This reviewer is frankly at a loss to understand how any intelligent worth-while
unbiased judgment can be passed upon the manner in which the Supreme Court of
the United States has acquitted itself of the tremendous responsibility laid upon it
by the Fathers of the Constitution unless the philosophy of government which they
actually wrote into that instrument be lucidly and frankly presented. Moreover it
is of equal importance that this orthodox constitutional tradition be clearly differentiated from the later, alien born, crudely naturalistic, and drably egalitarian viewpoint of Jefferson and his adherents. Undeniably the two philosophies of government differed substantially, and the Court was committed without recourse to a
sound realization and expansion of the former, and can be justly criticised only
in so far as it has failed in that task, within the ambit set for it by the basic law
and its subsequent amendments. If, outside of this prescribed ambit, the functioning of our constitutional set-up affords ground for well-taken criticism then the
t Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School
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responsibility for that criticism must be rested upon the proper shoulders. The
entire onus cannot be laid upon the Court.
Unwarrantably assuming, as the author seems to do, either the substantial identity
of the two traditions or the greater orthodoxy of the Jeffersonian viewpoint he has
provided himself with a powerful club with which to belabor the Court unfairly
and at will. In gaining this advantage, if such it really be-in the light of all
the material facts in the historical record-the author has done so at the cost of
maneuvering himself into the unstrategic and unenviable position, from a controversial standpoint, of begging practically his whole thesis.
Turning to a criticism of his affirmative case suffice it to say that the cumulative
weight and effect of the historical inaccuracies, the Constitutional misstatements,
the misleading innuendoes and implications, the superficial interpretations, the banal
irrelevancies, and the woeful lack of dependable evidences of real scholarship which
it develops can only seriously weaken, if not entirely destroy, the confidence of the
discerning and thoughtful reader in the writer's thesis as a whole. In a word we
might confidently submit that practically all of the major conclusions upon which
the author rests his thesis not only could be successfully traversed by a well advised
hostile critic but in fact should be in the interests of both historical truth and sound
American scholarship.
In the judgment of this reviewer the book is dangerous and unwholesome reading
for tyros in the field of Constitutional history and theory, while from the standpoint
of mature students in that field, for the reasons above stated, it is just another one
of those partisan literary "duds" which only too often of late have clouded the
proper atmosphere of calm deliberate political thinking and consequent effective
political action.

Louis J. Portsf
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